DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 128 698 CG 010 804

AUTHOR Erkut, Sumru; Jaquette, Dan
TITLE Moral Judgement and Prosocial Behavior: An Interactional Approach.
PUB DATE 76
NOTE 30p.; Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association (New York, N.Y., April, 1976)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$2.06 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Behavioral Science Research; *Behavior Patterns; *Conflict Resolution; Ethical Values; *Helping Relationship; *Interaction Process Analysis; *Moral Development; *Social Behavior; Social Values; Speeches

ABSTRACT

The study focuses on the interaction between moral development and situational factors as it affects prosocial behavior. Three experimental conditions varied the permissibility of interrupting a task to help an "ailing" confederate. A situation by moral judgment interaction was predicted. Stage three and four subjects, defining right action in accordance with conventional expectations or obligations would not help in any of the three conditions. Stage five subjects, defining right action in terms of human rights and contractual obligations would help in the Permission condition. The results support these predictions. It is only within the extended boundaries of Permission condition that Stage five subjects were able to resolve the conflict between their responsibility to the welfare of the "victim" and their contractual agreement with the experimenter. The implication of the study is that neither knowledge of situational variables by itself nor knowledge of moral judgment alone are sufficient to predict moral action. The critical factor seems to be the interaction between situation and moral judgment. (Author)

MORAL JUDGMENT AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR:

AN INTERACTIONAL APPROACH

Sumru Erkut

Harvard University,
Center for Middle Eastern Studies

Boston University

Dan Jaquette

Harvard University,
Laboratory for Human Development

Paper presented as part of the Symposium on Cognitive Processes in Developmental Social Psychology at the 1976 Eastern Psychological Association meetings.

The typical prosocial behavior situation poses a moral dilemma to the bystander who by virtue of being a witness to the emergency is in a position to intervene on behalf of the "victim". Latane and Darley (1970) present a model of prosocial behavior which states that "before a bystander will intervene in an emergency, he must notice that something is happening, interpret that event as an emergency, and decide that he has a personal responsibility for coping with it" (p.121). In the present study we are interested in a bystander's conception of his personal responsibility for the victim and the effect of this conception on his prosocial behavior.

The nature of bystander responsibility for the victim's welfare is ambiguous in emergency situations depending on the conflict between responsibility to the victim and influences which inhibit intervention. The possibility of embarrasment if intervention should be unnecessary, norms which make intervention socially inappropriate, prior commitment to other activities, are examples of factors inhibiting intervention on behalf of the victim. To the extent that there is a conflict between the victim's welfare, on the one hand, and inhibitory influences, on the other, the bystander is faced with a moral dilemma. He must somehow resolve this conflict if he is to intervene. We propose that the resolution of this moral dilemma is in part dependent on cognitive-developmental stages of moral reasoning put forth by Kohlberg (1969).

These stages represent the process whereby an individual defines the rights and duties operating in the prosocial situation, determining general parameters of moral action.

Kohlberg has postulated the existence of six qualitatively distinct stages of moral judgment which provide the individual with general principles of justice for regulating moral claims among individuals and social institutions. These justice structures form an invariant and universal sequence of developmental moral systems, each succeeding stage resolving certain conflicts characteristic of the preceding stage. The development of higher, more differentiated and integrated, stages of moral judgement influence choice in moral action "... by bringing sensitivity to new aspects of the moral situation, while ruling out other aspects ..." (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 230). With progression from one stage to the next, the individual is able to rule out certain factors as the bases for moral judgment (Turiel, 1966; 1969). In place of these discarded notions, the individual conceives of a new set of elements in his social relationships which are of a more comprehensive and less logically conflicting nature. For example, with the development of Stage 4 the individual is able to discard the Stage 3 notion of justice as conformity to conventional stereotypes in favor of a more universally applicable concept of formal obligations of the self to his social system. These elements shed a new light on moral dilemmas confronting the individual, thus,

providing him with a more adequate rationale for his behavior. As rationales for behavior become more universal there is greater consistency of moral behavior across differing situations.

Two studies reported by Kohlberg (1969) provide evidence for the effect of moral judgment on moral action. In a study of cheating under a testing situation of "low" supervision, 42 percent of students at Stages 3 and 4 cheated, compared to only 11 percent of students at Stage 5. Subjects at the Conventional Stages of 3 and 4 define cheating as wrong only if expectational or societal standards determine such behavior to be wrong. If others around them are cheating, or if authorities do not seem to care, the conventional basis for non-cheating is eroded. State 5 subjects, on the other hand, define the testing situation as one in which they have an implicit contract with the testor not to cheat. The newly developed notion of social contract at Stage 5 provides them with a justification for not cheating which has not become clouded with ambiguities in the conventional milieu. Hence there is greater consistency of honesty in both high and low supervision situations.

The second example where moral judgment seems to affect action comes from Milgram's (1963) obedience study, where an authority figure forces subjects to violate the welfare of another individual. For Stage 3 and 4 subjects, definition of "right" in this situation is synonomous with the dictates of conventional authority, hence there is likely to be no defiance of the experimenter. At Stage 5,

despite the differentiation of human rights from conventional obligations, these subjects also continue to punish the "victim", because of their sensitivity to a contractual agreement to work on the experiment. Only subjects capable of Stage 6 reasoning, where human rights are differentiated from contractual agreement, can integrate the two claims into a hierarchy in which human rights have a clear priority. Because they are able to conceive of human rights as having precedence over contractual agreements, Stage 6 subjects refuse to follow the orders of the experimenter's authority. The empirical results are consistent with this interpretation: 75 percent of Stage 6 subjects defied experimenter's orders, while only 13 percent of those in lower stages were able to do so.

Kohlberg's findings support our claim that moral reasoning corresponds to differences in overt "moral" behavior. However, neither of the above mentioned studies, nor any others known to us, attempt to experimentally vary the moral situation to investigate both consistency and variance in behavior across moral stages. By holding the situation constant, Kohlberg's studies have failed to explore the possibility that different stages of moral judgment may be relevant to moral action only under specific conditions. The present study focuses on the interaction between differing situations and moral stages. It is our central thesis that by themselves neither knowledge of the situation nor knowledge of a

person's moral stage are sufficient for a behavioral prediction; we need to know both to predict prosocial behavior.

The moral dilemma for people in prosocial situations arises when there is conflict between their sense of responsibility for the welfare of the victim and the forces which, either implicitly or explicitly, inhibit the type of response necessary for successful intervention. Our experimental situations involve such a conflict between victim welfare and inhibitive factors where the three conditions vary the permissibility of interrupting the task on which the subject is working. In the Permission condition the experimenter tells the subject he can go into the adjoining room to get some coffee; in the Prohibition condition she tells him that he should work fast and continuously on the task and that she will time him. In the No Information condition, neither coffee, nor the timed nature of the task is mentioned. A few minutes after the experimenter leaves, sounds of moaning and groaning are heard from the adjoining room produced by the experimenter's confederate. After a period of time the confederate enters the subject's room complaining of a stomach pain. He asks the subject to call his roommate to get him some pills he urgently needs or to go to the pharmacy himself, mentioning that the latter course would b ng him the pills faster. There is, thus, a direct conflict between those actions which promote the welfare of the "victim" and the three different levels of obligation by which the subject is attached

to his experimental task. All subjects in our study reasoned at Stages 3, 4, 5, or a combination thereof. In the following section we shall characterize the nature of the moral conflict for these three stages and present hypotheses for behavior in the three experimental conditions (see table 1).

Stage 3: Moral reasoning at this stage is characterized by the newly developed cognitive structure of mutual perspective-taking (Selman, 1971). This capacity enables a person to view social interactions from the third person perspective resulting in the notion of "generalized expectations" to which both self and other conform. The content of these expectational systems are dependent on the particular relationships involved.

To a Stage 3 subject, the experimental situation presents a conflict of expectations. If he stops working to help, he is letting down expectations concerning the behavior appropriate of an experimental subject. If he ignores the victim's plea for help, he is ignoring expectations to help a person in need. The resolution for a Stage 3 subject tends to be that of conforming to the expectations of the experimenter with whom he has formed a closer, more concrete relationship. The Stage 3 subject has yet to structurally differentiate his responsibility to the psychological testing situation and the obligation to help an obviously ailing person. Both of these compelling forces are derived from the ambiguous notion of interpersonal expectations, expectations which

are relative to the persons and situation at hand. Since both claims have a common moral structure, the claim with the most salient expectations will tend to override those of the other. Therefore, to the extent that the only concrete interpersonal relationship in this situation is between the subject and the experimenter, Stage 3 subjects will conform to their conception of the experimenter's expectations and be unlikely to help.

The three experimental conditions provide no basis for making the subject's relationship with the victim more dominant than his relationship with the experimenter. They also do nothing to alter the subject's conception of the experimenter's expectations to include the possibility of interrupting the task to help the victim. The No Information condition is mute on this point. The additional information provided in the Prohibition condition, if anything, reinforces the expectation that he should work on the task continuously. In the Permission condition the experimenter tells him he can go in the next room to get coffee, thus positively sanctions interrupting the task. Yet a Stage 3 person is bound by concrete expectations governing his behavior and also the intentions which motivate that behavior. Since the only legitimate intention to interrupt the task would be to get coffee, they are not able to stop their work for other reasons. Therefore, even in the Permission condition interrupting the task to help the victim is not considered a justifiable option. We hypothesize that there

will be no differences in helping behavior across the experimental conditions for Stage 3 Ss; in all conditions the likehood of helping will be low.

Stage 4: The distinguishing feature of Stage 4 moral reasoning is the further development in perspective taking ability which enables one to conceive of a multi-faceted social order independent of the particular expectational systems of Stage 3. What regulates the relationship between two individuals is not expectations based on mutual friendships, but each individual's relationship to a commonly shared, complex, and formalistic societal order. Each individual has a positive obligation to maintain the fixed rules and regulations which uphold the system because these rules are the basis for governing interpersonal interaction.

To the Stage 4 subject, the experimenter represents the institution of "science" wherein the experimental situation is embodied. He has a positive obligation to obey the experimenter as the representative of that social institution which determines the nature of his obligations to the experiment. On the other hand, the victim's distress also represents a set of potential obligations to help those in need. Thus, at this stage the conception of conflict between helping the victim and working on the task is in terms of conflicting social obligations. However, the subject's basis for determining the nature of his obligation to the victim is regulated by fixed, formal regulations of the

experimental setting: the experimenter did not place him in charge of this ailing person, therefore, his only concrete positive obligation is to the task. The subject must regulate his behavior according to rules which have been explicitly laid down for him by the experimenter.

In the Permission condition permission to go into the other room concerns getting coffee only and does not provide any information about a positive obligation he might have for the welfare of the victim. The other two conditions similarly leave the nature of his obligations unchanged because the task-oriented nature of the experimenter's instructions rule out the creation of a positive obligation to the victim. Therefore, we hypothesize that Stage 4 subjects will demonstrate an equally low level of helping behavior in all three experimental conditions because of their obligation to the experimental task.

Stage 5: The distinguishing feature of Stage 5 moral reasoning is a new conception of how relations among individuals and relations between individuals and society ought to be regulated. At this stage the individual clearly differentiates between the rights of all persons, on the one hand, and the basis for his obligations to the societal order, on the other. Here the function of societal order is the same as that for Stage 4, in that society serves to regulate relations among individuals. However, as opposed to Stage 4, in which the nature of those regulations are

determined by existing institutions and authorities, in Stage 5 they are based on a priori human rights. These human rights form a basis for interaction among free individuals who enter into agreements through formal contractual principles. Implicit in the notion of the social contract is that the individual is free to think and believe what he wants; the motives of his actions are outside the public domain. What is regulated by the contract is behaviors which directly affect others' welfare and individual rights.

In the experimental situation the Stage 5 subject is aware that the victim's welfare rights are in conflict with his continued work on the experimental task. However, his contractual obligations conflict with his concern for the victim. The subject has successfully differentiated between conventional expectations and obligations inhibiting intervention in the experimental situation and the victims' claims to welfare. However, he has not distinguished between individual human rights and the basis for his social contract with the experimenter. These two notions are equivalent structural aspects of his moral judgment because the social contract represents the means by which individual rights are transformed into social responsibilities. Therefore, given the nature of the contract with the experimenter, Stage 5 subjects will not be able to reinterpret and, thus, resolve the conflicting claims operating in the situation unless the nature of his

contract with the experiment is altered.

In the No Information condition the situation presents no cues which would alter the subjects' contract with the experimenter. In the Prohibition condition the nature of the contract is made even more strict. However, the additional information provided in the Permission condition alters the Stage 5 subjects' conception of the contract. The permission to interrupt the task to get coffee signifies a flexible contract. Within the bounds of this flexibility, the subject can interrupt the task for whatever reason, in this case, to help an ailing person and still not violate his basic contract. This contrasts with the effect of Permission on the prosocial behavior of Stage 3 and 4 subjects. In these stages the permission instructions are assimilated within the expectations or positive obligations which demand conformity for both behavior (interrupting the task) and intentionality (only to get coffee). Therefore, we hypothesize that while Stage 5 subject in the Prohibition and No Information conditions will be no more helpful than Stage 3 and 4 subjects, Stage 5 subjects in the Permission condition will help significantly more than others. The overall major hypothesis of the study is that there will be a significant interaction between Stage 5 and Permission condition, leading to a greater incidence of helping.

METHODS

Subjects: Male undergraduates at a large university in Boston served as the subject pool for the sample. A random list of subjects was generated from the student roster. Each potential subject was individually contracted by phone and asked to participate in a study of the personality of "normal" adults which would take place in two, two-hour sessions. Subjects were told they would receive $9.00 for their participation at the end of the second session. Of the potential subjects contacted by phone, 160, about 85 percent, agreed to take part in the study. Of this group, 90 percent, or 148, actually showed up for the first session. Only 88 percent, or 130 subjects, completed both sessions of the study. The final sample was composed of 114 male undergraduates as 14 subjects were excluded from the analyses due to procedural changes during the first two weeks of data collection.

Procedure: In Session 1 subjects filled out paper and pencil tests of personality,[1] among them a written version of Kohlberg's moral judgment interview (1970). Three to six weeks later subjects were scheduled for individual testing in Session 2. In this session upon his arrival each subject was met by a female experimenter who ushered him to a room and administered three tests. Next, he was asked to evaluate characteristics of individuals on the basis of paragraphs taken from short stories. At this point, the experimenter gave him the test form to look over but told him not

to start working until she came back from checking on the subject in the next room. She stepped into the adjoining room and talked with the subject there for a short while--this other subject was the experimenter's confederate. Upon her return she completed the instructions according to which experimental condition the subject was in. For the Permission condition, upon her return she told the subject she had made some coffee while in the other room. It would be ready soon and that he could go in and get some if he wanted to. For the Prohibition condition she told him to work fast and continuously on the task and left him a stop watch to time himself. The No Information condition constituted not mentioning going into the next room for coffee or the timed nature of the task. The experimenter then left the subject ostensibly to attend some business on another floor of the building.

Four minutes after the experimenter left, the sounds of distress in the adjoining room began. These sounds consisted mainly of moaning and groaning, intended to sound like they were caused by severe stomach cramps. The distress sounds lasted 135 seconds, first increasing in intensity, then subsiding, then increasing again. Several males, ages 19 and 20, acted as "victims," all highly trained to sound and act alike.

The subjects' behavior was observed behind a one-way mirror by two independent observers whose observations agreed close to 100 percent. If the subject entered the victim's room, he said

that his stomach was "killing" him, asked if he could lie down on the couch in the subject's room; without waiting for a reply went ahead and lay down. If the subject did not enter the victim's room within 135 seconds, the victim took the initiative,walked into the subject's room and behaved as above.

While lying on the couch the victim said he had a stomach problem and had run out of pills. In the sequence of actions that followed the victim always reacted to the somewhat varied behavior of subjects in a way that allowed him to perform the next part of the sequence in exactly the same manner. For example, if a subject attempted to leave the room, saying "I'll go get the experimenter," the victim tried to stop him by indicating that the experimenter had told him she was going to one of the other floors and that it would be impossible to find her. Or if the subject offered some other form of help, the victim said, "Let me just lie down here for a while."

After lying on the couch a short while the victim struggled to get up, adding, "I don't want to bother you. There is a lounge on the 15th floor where I can lie down for a longer time." He slowly began to get up but slumped back on the arm of the couched and said, "May be there is something you can do for me, I have a prescription for my pills with me, but I forgot to have it filled. If you could call my roommate for me, he would come over and take the prescription down to Harvard Square to have it

filled. Or if you have the time, may be you could take it down to the Square, that would be much quicker."

After this interaction most subjects left the room. The experimenter who "happened" to be coming back met the subject on the corridor and inquired about what had gone on in her absence. She said she would take care of everything, and took the "ailing" person with her from the room. She returned in a few minutes, told the subject someone had gone to the pharmacy and waited for him to finish the task. The purpose of delaying the debriefing was to increase opportunities for spontaneous expression of suspicion. After the subject completed the task, the experimenter asked him to stay a little longer to answer some questions about his impression of the study. These questions were aimed at eliciting any hint of a suspicion the subject might have about the authenticity of the situation. Then he was extensively and thoroughly debriefed.

RESULTS

The subject's response to the victim's plea for help was scored on a five-point scale where 1= refuse$_s$ to help, 2= decide$_s$ to find someone else to help, 3= offers to make phone call to roommate, 4= offers to go to pharmacy, and 5= offers to go to pharmacy and makes additional offers to help, like offering to find someone to stay with the victim while he goes to the pharmacy. Unexpected events showed that subjects do what they say they will. In two cases,

uspicion score and action of subject was insignificant, thus it as decided that no subject would be excluded from the analysis ue to his suspicion score.

Thirty-five subjects, slightly over 28 percent, provided ctive help--corresponding to a score of 3 or more on the five-point cale . There was a marginally significant difference among xperimental conditions in active attempts to help (x^2 = 5.79, f= 2, p= .06). The frequency of active help was about equal in he Prohibition and No Information conditions but greater in the ermission condition. The difference between the Permission ondition and the other two combined was significant (x^2 = 11.69, f= 1, p .001).

Moral judgment stage was independently assessed by two scorers ith an inter-scorer reliability of .85. When appropriate a minor

tage score was assigned along with a major score. In Kohlberg's scoring system a major score indicates a modal tendency where the majority of one's judgments fall under that stage; a minor score indicates that a substantial proportion, but less than the majority fall under that stage. Comparisons between the helping behavior of subjects with a dominant, or major, Stage 5 score and a minor Stage 5 score showed the two groups to be essentially similar, thus, they were pooled into one group. In all, there were 26 subjects in the sample with either a major or a minor Stage 5 score. Their behavior was compared to that of the group made up of subjects at Stage 3 and 4 with no Stage 5 reasoning. Thus, there were two levels of moral judgment: Major-minor Stage 5 versus other. In a 3x2 analysis of variance of helping behavior by experimental condition and moral judgment, a significant interaction effect was obtained as predicted ($F= 3.22$, $df= 2/110$, $p= .045$). The interaction was the only significant effect obtained. The cell means for helping behavior given in Table 2 clearly show that Stage 5 subjects in the Permission condition were the ones most likely to help.

DISCUSSION

The major hypothesis of the study was confirmed: Stage 5 subjects in the Permission condition were significantly more likely to provide active help than Stage 5 subjects in the other two conditions, and more helpful than Stage 3 and 4 subjects in

all three conditions. The implication of this finding is that knowing a person's stage of moral development allows us to infer how he will conceptualize the dilemma facing him in the prosocial situation, and, thus, increases our ability to predict his choice of action in a given social context. The findings point out that neither knowledge of the situation by itself nor knowledge of moral judgment alone are sufficient to predict moral action. The critical issue seems to be the interaction between situation and moral judgment.

In the experimental situations used in the present study, the forces which compel Stage 3 and 4 subjects to help and those which inhibit their actions are of the same order: for Stage 3 subjects it is expectations, for Stage 4 subjects it is obligations. Because the dominant expectations and obligations were in the direction of non-intervention in the experimental situation, the incidence of helping was low among these subjects. Stage 5 subjects, on the other hand, were capable of differentiating the issue of victim's welfare from the conventional expectations and obligations inhibiting prosocial behavior among Stage 3 subjects and 4 subjects. Yet they could not make the further differentiation between their contractual agreement with the experiment and the bases for the victim's right to personal welfare. Due to this lack of complete differentiation Stage 5 subjects could not form a clear hierarchy where welfare issues take precedence. Thus, they were also

generally unhelpful, except in so far as situational conditions permitted them to help the ailing person and still remain within the bounds of their contractual agreement. The Permission condition provided the situational cues to make the contact more flexible, leading to greater helpfulness. When interrupting the task was seen as permissible within the behavioral bounds of the contract, Stage 5 subjects were able to act upon their concern for the sick person's welfare.

The Permission condition had an effect on the behavior of Stage 5 subject but not on those who were Stage 3 or 4. This differential effect of situational variables was predicted from the stage characteristics of the subjects. To a person at Stage 5, contractual obligations concern behaviors and their direct effect on others' welfare. It does not concern the motivation for those behaviors. In the same sense that John Stuart Mill champions freedom of speech without concern for its content, Stage 5 treats motives for behavior as a matter of personal conscience. Stage 5 subjects conceived of the permission to get coffee as a general permission to interrupt the task. To them the instructions imply that interrupting the task will not essentially break the contract to work on the experiment. However, Stage 3 and 4 subjects were not able to interpret the Permission instructions in this light. At these stages conformity to conventional standards is much more exacting of both actions and the specific conventions

which influence these actions. Thus, the permission condition only altered one small aspect of the Stage 3 expectations and Stage 4 obligations to the experimental task: the permissibility of obtaining coffee.

Going beyond the data at hand, we can conjecture that had we had any Stage 6 subjects in our sample they would have helped in all experimental conditions. Since people at Stage 6 are conceptually able to differentiate between the welfare rights of individuals and obligations to uphold a voluntary contract, they can integrate the two into a hierarchy where individual rights take a clear precedence over contractual obligations.

It should be noted here that the relationship between moral action and moral judgment being discussed holds only in situations where there is an ambiguity over what constitutes "correct" action. For example, if the experimenter had communicated to the subjects that they ought to be concerned with the victim's welfare, thus removing the ambiguity over correct action, most subjects would have provided active help. In situations where expectations, norms, or obligations for intervention are highly salient, there is no moral dilemma; hence, moral judgment is less relevant in predicting behavior.

There was one unexpected finding in this study; namely, the similarity in the behavior of subjects with only a minor Stage 5 score to those who were major Stage 5 subject. This similarity in

moral behavior seems to indicate that cognitive developmental tendencies characteristic of a given stage are reflected earlier in action than they are articulated in language. Persons with only a minor Stage 5 score are clearly capable of Stage 5 reasoning, however, it is not yet the dominant orientation they use in judging moral dilemmas. Our findings may well be indicative of what Piaget (1932) calls the difference between practical and theoretical moral judgment, where practical (behavior) precedes theoretical (judgmental) development.

Within the literature on prosocial behavior the present study is somewhat unique. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only study which makes a situation-by-personality prediction about helping behavior, where moral judgment is the personality variable (Gergen and Meter, 1972). Our attempt to "get inside" the minds of subjects has increased our understanding of how situational variables affect behavior. Using moral judgment as a mediating variable between situational manipulations and action has allowed us to infer the subjects' conceptualizations of the experimental situation. By distinguishing between qualitatively different conceptualizations of the experimental manipulations, we were able to find stable differences that may have been overlooked had we not used an interactional approach. The structural characteristics of moral judgment are only a limited aspect of personality, but one which is important in prosocial research because of the moral

dilemma involved. To the extend that other equally important factors operate in prosocial situations, we would expect other stable personality components to mediate between the situation and the final behavioral outcome. However, the generality of our findings on the importance of the interaction between personality and situational variables for predicting prosocial action cannot be established until more studies investigate social behavior form such an interactional and cognitive developmental perspective.

FOOTNOTE

[1]These were Rotter's (1966) test of perception of control over the environment, Schwartz's (1968) test of a tendency to ascribe responsibility to the self for others welfare, Berkowitz and Lutterman's (1968) test of social responsibility, Christie and Geis's (1970) test of Machiavellianism (Mach IV), and Rokeach's (1973) inventory of social values. Results of the relationship between these personality tests and prosocial behavior are reported elsewhere (Staub, 1974).

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TABLE 2

Cell means of helping behavior by levels of moral judgment and experimental treatment.

Moral Judgment

	Major	Minor 5	Other	
No Information	3.11		3.44	$\bar{X}$
	9		24	N
Permission	4.29		3.20	$\bar{X}$
	9		31	N
Prohibition	3.63		3.06	$\bar{X}$
	8		35	N

Interaction: $p < .045$

TABLE I

Stage	Description of Stage Characteristics*	Conflict	Resolution	Effect of Experimental Conditions	Predicted Behavior
Stage 3	Mutual perspective-taking orientation to fulfill expectations of significant others; conformity to stereotypical images of majority or "natural" behavior; judgment by intentions.	Conflict between meeting E's expectations to be a good subject and helping a person in need.	Uphold expectations from the more salient relationship, that between S and E.	No effect in making the S and V relationship more dominant than the S and E relationship, or in changing S's conception of E's expectations to include helping V	Helping behavior equally low in all experimental conditions.
Stage 4	Conception of a social system above dyadic relations; interpersonal relations regulated by each person's relationship to a mutually shared impersonal social order; regard for earned expectations of others.	Conflict between obligation to continue working on the task and obligation to help a person in need.	Fulfill obligations to institutions regulating S's relationship with both E and V.	No effect; conditions leave S's obligation to work on the task unaltered.	Helping behavior equally low in all experimental conditions.
Stage 5	Orientation to welfare rights and contractual obligations to social order; social-contract approach to law-making; contract regulates behavior having direct effect on self-interest of people; individual free to think and believe as he chooses	Conflict between V's rights to his welfare and S's voluntary agreement to take part in experiment.	Fulfill conditions of contract voluntarily agreed to.	Permission condition makes contract more flexible, possible to interrupt task for helping V without breaking contract.	Helping behavior low in No Information and Prohibition conditions; high in Permission condition.

*Adapted from Kohlberg, 1967, p.171.